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This research report makes the following claims: 
1] There was not an unambiguous economic advantage of hybrid corn over the open-pollinated varieties
in 1936. 
2] The early adoption of hybrid corn before 1937 can be better explained by a sustained propaganda
campaign conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry Agard Wallace.  The Department's campaign echoed that of the commercial seed companies.
 The most prominent hybrid seed company, Pioneer Hi-Bred Company, was founded by Wallace and
he retained a financial interest while serving as Secretary. 
3] The early adopters of hybrid seed were followed by later adopters as a consequence of the droughts
of 1934 and especially 1936.  The eventual improvement of yields as newer varieties were introduced
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Every economist knows the story of hybrid corn.  Zvi Griliches (1930-1999) made the 
adoption of hybrid varieties in the United States the exemplar for his model of 
technological diffusion [Griliches 1957b].  This classic article is taught in every graduate 
program and routinely receives over twenty Web of Science citations a year.  As 
evidence of its iconic status, the article’s citation counts have been rising steadily over 
the last half century [Diamond 2004: 380].  Reproducing data originally collected by the 
Department of Agriculture’s Statistical Reporting Service on the percentage of corn 
acreage planted with hybrid seed, Griliches observed a lazy S-shaped cumulative logistic 
diffusion pattern.  Figure 1 returns to the original data and extends the coverage to 1960 
(the last date available).  It illustrates the well-known shape.  
Hybrid corn (technically “double-cross inbred-hybrid corn”) was “invented” by 
Donald F. Jones in 1917-1918 and was developed and introduced on a trial basis in 1924 
by Henry Agard Wallace.  In the 1920s the Iowa Experiment Station began scientific 
field trials.  Wallace’s hybrid was first entered in 1921.  It won first place in 1924.  It was 
first sold commercially in 1925.  Competitors began sales in 1928. Widespread 
commercial adoption began in 1932 [Olmstead 2006: IV-9; Zuber and Robinson 1941: 
589].  In 1933 about 0.1 percent of the nation’s corn acreage was planted to the new seed.  
By 1960, 96.3 percent of acreage was planted to hybrid varieties [USDA, Agricultural 
Statistics 1962, Table 46: 41; USDA, Track Records, April 2004: 19].   Griliches 
considered the adoption pattern displayed in Figure 1 to have been remarkably rapid 
[Griliches 1957b: 502].   
Griliches’s explanation for the rapid and complete abandonment of open-
pollinated corn in favor of the new hybrid varieties was based on a simple set of “stylized 
facts.”  He considered hybrid corn superior to the traditional open-pollinated varieties 
from the beginning and suggested that that superiority was established in 1935 and 
persisted thereafter.
1  The advantage of hybrids, according to Griliches, could be 
                                                 
1 The date 1935 is the year that acreage planted to hybrid corn exceeded ten percent of the total in the 
district at the heart of the hybrid revolution.   Griliches chose ten percent “as an indicator that the  
Richard Sutch, Adoption of Hybrid Corn 
Page 3 of 26 
objectively measured by the relative increase in yield over the open-pollinated corn 
[Griliches 1957b: 516-517].  He assumed that the new varieties required no significant 
increase in capital investment or annual inputs.  According to this analysis the adoption 
process in a given district was one of disequilibrium transition [p. 503].  Griliches 
attributed the lags in the process to “imperfect knowledge.”  It “takes time to realize that 
things have in fact changed” [p. 516].  The spread of hybrid corn geographically was 
slowed somewhat by the supply lags in developing and introducing hybrid varieties 
tailored to the specific soil type, weather conditions, and latitude of the peripheral 
regions.
2   But even this process was rapid.  Using the rule of thumb suggested by 
Griliches to mark the start of an adoption process as the date that ten percent of acreage 
was planted to hybrid corn, Iowa in 1936 was followed by Illinois, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin in 1937, by Minnesota in 1938, and by Ohio, Nebraska, and Missouri in 
1939.
3  See Figure 2. 
 The development of hybrid corn and its rapid adoption were, nearly from the 
beginning, hailed as a triumph of twentieth-century biotechnology and one that carried 
with it enormous welfare benefits [Sprague 1946:101].
4  In a chart that is perhaps even 
                                                                                                                                                 
development had passed the experimental stage and that superior hybrids were available to farmers in 
commercial quantities.” The region where this breakthrough occurred was the Sixth Iowa Crop Reporting 
District [Griliches 1957b: 507 and Table II, p. 508].  The sixth district comprised Bremer, Black Hawk, 
Benton, Buchanan, Linn, Delaware, Jones, Dubuque, Jackson, and Clinton Counties, all in Iowa. 
 
2 Paul David, in an insightful review, has criticized the Griliches approach “for lacking any real micro-level 
technology choice model” [David 2003:5].  Edwin Mansfield [1961] can be credited with supplying such a 
model to explain the logistic shape (although as David points out, Mansfield’s model is simply one of many 
formulations consistent with the data).  Mansfield suggested that the probability that a non-user would 
switch to a new technology would be a function of the number of those in the immediate neighborhood 
who had already accepted the technology.  This “contagion” model, borrowed from epidemiology, leads to 
the logistic diffusion curve.  Bronwyn Hall [2004] provides a review of the theoretical literature on 
diffusion from both sociology and economics.  
 
3 State level data on the percentage of corn acres planted to hybrids are available in various annual issues of 
Agricultural Statistics.  I have relied on the volumes for 1945 (Table 46, p. 42), 1948 (Table 50, p. 48), 
1950 (Table 49, p. 47), 1952 (Table 43, p. 40), 1954 (Table 38, p. 30), 1957 (Table 40, p. 39), 1959 (Table 
43, p. 33), and 1961 (Table 43, p.33).   
 
4 Griliches estimated the rate of return on hybrid corn research of at least 700 percent annually as of 1955 
[Griliches 1958:419]. 
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more famous, at least among plant scientists, than Griliches’s logistic, the rise in corn 
yields per acre is employed to suggest that hybrid corn was responsible for a 
biotechnological revolution that abruptly ended a sustained period of “biological stasis.”  
Figure 3 displays the “hockey stick” graph reproduced dozens of time in the scientific 
literature.
5  The chart plots USDA statistics on corn yields per acre dating back to 1866.  
There was a remarkable stability in yields with no discernable trend before 1936.
6  
Thereafter yields began to increase and they have continued upward ever since.  Yields 
per acre rose from an average of 25 bushels per acre before 1936 to 135 bushels per acre 
in the years 2000-2002 [Carter et al 2006: Series Da693-694], more than a five-fold 
increase.  Perhaps too casually, this increase has been attributed (1) to the continuing 
adoption of the hybrid varieties between 1936 and 1960 and (2) to the continuing 
improvement of hybrid traits as new varieties were introduced between 1936 and 1989 
[Duvick 1992]. 
I say “perhaps too casually,” because the introduction of hybrids was also 
accompanied by the increase use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, increased planting 
densities, and the adoption and improvements in planting and harvesting machinery.  
However, these developments were intimately interrelated.  One of the hybrid traits 
introduced improved the plant’s ability to absorb nitrogen fertilizers and indeed the use of 
fertilizer was required to reach the potential of the hybrids.  Similarly, the increased 
planting densities were possible only because of traits that reduced the plant’s 
requirements for full sunlight and that increased its resistance to lodging – the tendency 
of the plant to lie down or fall over when beaten down by the wind.  Even then high 
density was possible only with the heavy application of fertilizer. Increased planting 
                                                 
5 As an indication of how ubiquitously Figure 3 appears, I note that a standard textbook on corn for plant 
scientists [Smith, Betrán, and Runge 2004] reproduces a version of this chart four times in four separate 
chapters [Troyer 2004: Chapter 1.4, Figure 32, p. 218; Betrán, Bänziger, and Menz 2004: Chapter 2.3, 
Figure 6, p. 351; Wisner and Baldwin 2004: Chapter 3.8, Figure 2, p. 759; and Halauer 2004: Chapter 4.4, 
Figure 1, p. 901]. 
 
6 Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode [2008] have challenged the notion of a biological stasis before 1936.  
They view the stability of yields before 1936 as due to a balance of conflicting forces some of which would 
depress yields and counterbalancing ones that worked to raise yields.    
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densities required the abandonment of the horse and the horse-wide path between the 
rows of corn.  Thus the adoption of machinery was a necessary component for achieving 
the full potential of hybrid corn.
7  Since hybrid seed, synthetic fertilizer, and gasoline 
tractors were a necessary triad, it is not really possible to partition responsibility for the 
yield increases among them.  
The continuing improvement in the performance of hybrids after their initial 
introduction is an important part of the story.  Figure 4 reproduces the results of field 
experiments conducted in 1989 and 1990 in central Iowa.  Forty-one varieties introduced 
between 1934 through 1989 by Pioneer Hi-Bred (a leading seed producer and a key 
player in the story to follow), “all popular in their time,” together with the most famous 
open-pollinated variety, Reid’s Yellow Dent, were planted in adjacent fields in a 
demonstration designed to illustrate the advance of yields due to genetic improvement 
[Duvick 1992: 70].  As Figure 4 illustrates, yields advanced at an average rate of 1.16 
bushels per acre per year throughout this 55-year period. 
Despite the undeniable improvement in plant traits and the obvious appeal of the 
Griliches adoption story, this report makes the following claims: 
1] There was not an unambiguous economic advantage of hybrid corn over the 
open-pollinated varieties at the time of planting in 1936.   
2] The early adoption of hybrid corn before 1937 can be better explained by a 
sustained propaganda campaign conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at the 
direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Agard Wallace.  The Department’s 
message echoed that of the commercial seed companies.  Wallace was the founder of the 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Seed Company, the first and largest producer of hybrid seed.   
3] Later adopters of hybrid seed were motivated by the drought resistance of one 
experimental hybrid variety discovered during the drought of 1934 and vividly 
                                                 
7 On several of these points see: Castleberry, Crum, and Krull [1984: 33].    
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demonstrated during the drought of 1936.  The eventual improvement of yields as newer 
varieties were introduced and the imitative force of “collective logic” explain the 
continuation and acceleration of the process.  Given the required capital investments in 
fertilizer tanks and tractors and the inability to save and plant one’s own seed, adoption 
tended to be irreversible.   
4] The biological revolution in corn, commonly associated with the introduction 
of hybrid varieties, was not a unique phenomenon.  Indeed, I find remarkably similar 
“hockey stick graphs” for the yields per acre in cotton, wheat, tobacco, oats, potatoes, and 
barley.  The simultaneous increase in the yields of so many different crops during this 
period is more properly attributed to the discovery of an economical process for 
synthesizing ammonia and the consequent increase in the use of synthetic fertilizers. 
The Iowa Corn Yield Tests and Hybrid Superiority 
Griliches assumed that hybrid corn had an economically significant and 
unambiguous superiority over open-pollinated corn from the time it was first introduced.  
He reported that this superiority could be gauged by a 15- to 20-percent higher yield 
achieved with hybrid corn over the traditional open-pollinated varieties.  Griliches also 
suggested that this relative advantage applied to both high- and low-yielding soils, good 
years and bad [Griliches 1957b: 516-517; 1958: 421].  His citations to support this 
estimate of the yield advantage were from an unpublished Federal Commodity Insurance 
Corporation source dated 1942, and published sources dated 1940 [USDA], 1946 
[Sprague], and 1952 [Rogers and Collier].  None of these sources referred to the 1932-
1936 period of early adoption.  The 1940 USDA report cited the claims of “plant 
breeders” [Griliches 1957b:517].
8  G.F. Sprague, an agronomist at Iowa State College, 
based his 20-percent estimate on the increase in per acre yields observed in Iowa between 
                                                 
8 There was a survey of “scientists engaged in crop breeding” taken (probably) in 1938 that reported 
estimates of the hybrid yield advantage that ranged from 5 to 25 percent, the authors concluded that the 
probable range was 10 to 15 percent [Dowell and Jesness 1939: Table 1 and pp. 480-481].  This may have 
been the source for the USDA’s 1940 report of the opinions of “plant breeders.” 
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1933, when only 0.7 percent of the corn acreage was hybrid, and 1943, when 99.5 percent 
hybrid planting was reported and he attributed the entire advance to the use of hybrid 
seed [Sprague 1946: Figure 1, p. 101].
9  John Rogers, a professor of agronomy at College 
Station, Texas, and Jesse Collier, at the Texas Blackman Experiment Station, simply 
reported without citation “experience in other corn-growing regions” [1952: 7].   None of 
these reports seems a very reliable source and none explicitly examine the relative 
superiority of hybrid corn in the first half of the 1930s. 
The best and most appropriate data on the relative yields of different corn 
varieties are the reports of field trials conducted by the agricultural experiment stations. 
These remain unexploited by quantitative historians.
10  Beginning with the Iowa 
Agricultural Experiment Station in the early-1920s, many of the stations in corn-belt 
states conducted controlled plantings of open-pollinated, experimental hybrid, and 
commercially-available hybrid seeds and published the results in the Stations’ Bulletins.  
This paper relies on the data available from the Iowa Corn Yield Tests.  These are the 
most complete.  They begin at the earliest date.  And, they are the most relevant.  Iowa 
was both the heart of the Corn Belt and the first state to widely and most quickly adopt 
hybrid corn. 
                                                 
9 The actual increase in yields between those two years was 38 percent [USDA, Track Records, 2004], but 
1945 was a very poor year for Iowa corn, so perhaps Sprague, writing in 1945, tempered his estimate.   
 
10 Although not cited in his published Econometrica article [1957b], Griliches’s unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
for the University of Chicago contains a comment in an Appendix that rejects the Agricultural Experiment 
Station data: 
The data raise several difficult problems.  They represent results on one or several fields 
in the whole state, conducted under varying and better than average conditions.  The 
relation between the experiment station results and what the farmer may expect on his 
own farm is not clear.  In particular, this relation may not remain constant between 
different states.  For example, while the average yield in Iowa tests was around 80 
bushels per acre at a time when the average yield for the state was around 40 bushels, the 
North Carolina tests averaged more than 100 bushels, but at the same time the average 
state yield was only around 30 bushels [Griliches, Thesis, 1957a: 56-57]. 
These considerations may make the Iowa test results an exaggerated estimate of the absolute advantage, but 
all that is needed for Griliches’s disequilibrium model is an estimate of the relative advantage.  Elsewhere 
Griliches argued that the relative advantage was independent of the level of yield per acre.  Moreover, to 
the extent that the test results exaggerated the absolute gain, they bias the farmer’s calculus decision toward 
adoption, and thus they would bias the argument against the claim I make in this paper that the hybrid 
advantage was not large enough to encourage early adoptions. 
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For the Iowa tests the state was partitioned into 12 districts, shown in the inset 
map in Figure 5.  A volunteer farmer from each district, who was also a member of the 
Iowa Crop Improvement Association, planted several varieties in adjacent fields and 
employed a uniform cultivation practice to raise them to maturity.  At harvest, the yields 
were measured separately for each variety and reported back to the Experiment Station.   
The Table displayed in Figure 5 summarizes the results for the years 1926 through 1940.  
For each district and each year the average yield for all hybrid varieties tested is 
expressed relative to the average for all open-pollinated varieties.  It is immediately clear 
why the introduction of hybrid corn caused such excitement.  Of the 166 observations in 
the table, only two recorded a relative below 101 (district 3 in 1926 and district 8 in 
1927).  These data provide strong support for the concept of hybrid vigor, or “heterosis” 
to use the scientific term.  As we will see, however, hybrid vigor is not the same as 
economic superiority. 
Hybrid Vigor 
American corn, or more properly, “maize” (Zea mays, L.) is native to North 
America.
11  It originated in Mexico where farmers cultivated it for millennia, gradually 
improving the plant by the selection for genetically-based traits.  Before the development 
of hybrid corn the seed used for farm-planted corn was the result of natural cross-
pollination.  Under these conditions, corn is said to be “open-pollinated.”   Pollen, 
produced by the corn plant’s tassels, is released and carried on the air.  Some of the 
pollen typically reaches the cornsilks (the “ear shoots,” which are the stigmas of the 
female flower) of one or more nearby plants. The geminating pollen tube grows down the 
silk and fertilizes the egg cell, thereby starting the growth of a seed.  In principle each 
seed on an ear of corn could have a different male parent.  The fraction of corn seeds set 
by self-pollination is known to be very low.  If this fertilization process is left to the 
wind, selective breeding consists of choosing individual ears of corn on the basis of 
                                                 
11 The sources for this and the next several paragraphs are many, but the science is well-known so a 
detailed list of sources will be omitted.  References to the names and historical dates can be found in 
Duvick [2001].  For a history of corn varieties (germplasm), see Troyer [2004].  Much of the science is 
elaborated in Smith, Betrán, and Runge [2004]. 
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desirable plant or grain properties and saving those seeds for the following year’s crop.  
A great deal of natural hybridization between separate corn populations and varieties took 
place in this way.
12  As a consequence of repeated selection under open-pollination, corn 
lines evolved that were adapted to new climates and soil conditions such that corn 
cultivation spread across the North American continent in the nineteenth century.  
The next step, deliberate control of parentage, produced “varietal hybrids” in 
experiments conducted by farmers and agronomists in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Ever since Charles Darwin’s experiments with inbred and cross-
pollinated corn, reported in 1876, it was known that the progeny of inbred plants were 
inferior to those of the cross-bred hybrids.
13  In Darwin’s terms, hybrid plants had “innate 
constitutional vigour.”  The lack of this vigor in the inbreds is known as “inbreeding 
depression.”  Not surprisingly, Darwin’s results stimulated experimentation with 
deliberate cross-variety hybrids.   
Neither natural hybrids nor the deliberate varietal hybrids are the hybrid corn of 
the hybrid revolution under discussion.  Hybrid corn as it is known today is more 
accurately described as a hybrid of inbred lines.  Due to their inferior quality, the inbreds 
were generally avoided by plant breeders.  So it took a leap of imagination when George 
Shull and Edward East, working independently, crossed two pure inbred lines of corn 
(homozygous strains) and produced plants superior to the run-of-field open-pollinated 
varieties.  The results were published in 1908.  The Shull-East “single-cross” hybrid of 
inbred lines in principle could revolutionize corn farming.  Seeds could be produced on a 
field-wide basis by removing the tassels from one inbred line and allowing it to be 
fertilized by the pollen from a second inbred line planted in the neighboring row.  It 
seemed evident, however, that this approach was impractical.  Producing the inbred lines 
                                                 
12 The most popular open-pollinated variety at the time that the first hybrids were introduced was Reid’s 
Yellow Dent.  This was an accidental hybrid between a reddish semi-gourd and a yellow flint.  The story is 
told by Russell Lord [1947: 147] and Troyer [2004]. 
 
13 Darwin married his first cousin and their first child was retarded.  He had a life-long interest in 
inbreeding.  
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that were to be crossed involved laborious hand pollination and these parent lines were so 
depressed by inbreeding that their seed yields were extremely low, making the input costs 
to large-scale production prohibitive. 
The problem of producing hybrid seed that the farmer could afford was further 
compounded by the need to plant freshly-made hybrid seed each year.  If the seeds of an 
inbred hybrid were planted, the yields achieved the following season would drop 
significantly because seed from a hybrid field would suffer from inbreeding depression 
[Jugenheimer 1939: 18-19]. 
The practical problem was solved in 1918 by Donald F. Jones.  He found that a 
“double-cross” hybrid could be made by crossing two single-cross varieties.  The 
progeny, while generally not as productive as their single-cross parents, nevertheless out 
performed the open-pollinated varieties. Since single crosses were prolific parents (unlike 
the pure inbred lines) production costs for the double-crosses were reduced to an 
economical level.   
All of the hybrids in the Iowa Corn Tests recorded in the table in Figure 5 were 
double-cross varieties.  The trial results for the period 1926-1933 (before the drought of 
1934) are plotted both as a histogram and as a density estimate in Figure 6.  The average 
yield advantage of the hybrids was 9.3 percent (averaging across the 12 districts and 95 
observations).  The median yield advantage was 9 percent. It is clear that an advantage of 
15 to 20 percent would be an exaggeration for this period.  The average advantage in 
District 6, where the adoption of hybrid corn first took place, was only 7 percent. 
Although the 15-20 percent advantage cited by Griliches is an exaggeration for 
the period of first adoption, perhaps the story of a disequilibrium transition would be just 
as valid with the more modest 7 to 9 percentage advantage reported by the Iowa 
Experiment Station.  The typical yield with open-pollinated corn reported by the farmers 
conducting the Iowa corn yield tests, 1926 through 1933, was 61.3 bushels per acre 
[Shaw and Durost 1965, Table 12: 28].  Presumably, this represents the yield achieved  
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with best-practice farming by experienced farmers.  The state-wide average for that 
period, however, was only 38.2 bushels per acre.  Thus the typical farmer could anticipate 
a yield gain of less than four bushels per acre and an experienced best-practice farmer 
could anticipate perhaps as much as a six-bushel gain. 
Before we can conclude that an advantage in physical yield translated into an 
economic advantage, we must factor in the high price of hybrid corn seed and the 
depressed value of the corn crop.  With the advent of the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
the market price of corn came down from a high of 80 to 85 cents a bushel in the late 
1920s to 32 cents in 1931 and 1932 [Carter et al, Series Da697].   During the Depression 
hybrid seed was selling in Iowa for $6.00 a bushel [Culver and Hyde 2000: 91].
14  Since a 
bushel of seed would plant two acres [Duvick 1992: 71], a farmer would have to expect a 
financial gain approaching $3.00 an acre to be tempted to pay full price.
15  Expecting no 
more than 32 cents per bushel for the crop when sold, the advantage of the hybrid seed 
would have had to approach nine bushels per acre, not the four to six bushels that could 
be anticipated on the basis of the Iowa Corn Tests.  
Henry Agard Wallace and Hybrid Hype 
The puzzle then is why some adventurous farmers were willing to adopt hybrid corn 
before its economic superiority was demonstrated by controlled tests.  My suggestion has 
two parts: (1) there was an aggressive marketing campaign launched by the commercial 
seed companies directed at potential adopters, and (2) the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry 
Agard Wallace, a commercial promoter of hybrid seed and former President of the major 
seed company, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, put the full weight of the Federal 
government behind an advocacy of hybrid corn.     
                                                 
14 Elsewhere Culver and Hyde report “at the depths of the Depression, corn sold in Iowa for ten cents a 
bushel” and that Pioneer’s price was $5.50 a bushel [p. 147]. 
15 Corn seeding rates varied widely depending upon the local practice and climate.  States with abundant 
rainfall, such as Ohio, supported heavier seeding rates [Fernandez-Cornejo 2004: 8].    
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Henry Agard Wallace, Franklin Roosevelt’s first Secretary of Agriculture, was a 
multifaceted, complex, prolific, and eccentric man.
16  He was an early champion of 
scientific farming, a path-breaking plant scientist, a talented statistician and geneticist, 
American’s first econometrician, author of a dozen books, a journalist, and the influential 
editor of Wallaces’ Farmer, from 1921 to 1933, the most prominent agricultural 
magazine of its time.
17  Later he became the editor of The New Republic, 1946-1948.  
Wallace was a successful entrepreneur who made a personal fortune as the leading 
founder of the Hi-Bred Seed Company (later Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.).  Today, 
Pioneer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and is 
the largest seed company in the world with a market share in 1997 of 42 percent 
[Fernandez-Cornejo 2004: Table 12, p. 26; Beck 2004: 568].  Henry Agard Wallace was, 
according to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr [2000], America’s best Secretary of 
Agriculture.
18  He was Vice President of the United States during World War II – the 
most influential and powerful Vice President before Dick Cheney.  Wallace served as 
Secretary of Commerce during the economic transition to peace time (1945-1946).  He 
ran for President on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948.  The Des Moines Register 
identified Henry A. Wallace the "Most Influential Iowan of the 20th Century" on 
December 31, 1999.  His biographers identified him as the “state’s greatest son” [Culver 
and Hyde 2000: ix]. When he died of Lou Gehrig’s disease in 1965, the then-reigning 
Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, could declare, without hyperbole that: “No 
individual has contributed more to the abundance we enjoy today than Henry Wallace” 
[p. 531]. 
                                                 
16 As one index of his eccentricity, I note that Wallace was a mystic and an ambidextrous, vegetarian, 
teetotaler before any of these affectations was considered legitimate.  Republican teetotalers holding high 
office in Roosevelt’s New Deal administration were rare indeed.   The best biography of Wallace is by John 
C. Culver and John Hyde [2000] from which I draw the details in this paragraph. 
 
17 It was the USDA’s statistician Louis Bean that named Henry A. Wallace the first American 
econometrician based on Wallace’s book, Agricultural Prices [1920].  See Culver and Hyde [2000: 51]. 
 
18 Precision requires that I use Wallace’s middle name since his father, Henry Cantwell Wallace, was also 
Secretary of Agriculture (1921-1924), appointed by Warren Harding.  Another Henry Wallace in the family 
was Henry A. Wallace’s grandfather and the founder of Wallaces’ Farmer.   This Wallace had no middle 
name [Lord 1947].  
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A unifying theme – an obsession, really – for Wallace throughout this prolific and 
many-sided career was hybrid corn.  In 1910, two years after Shull and East reported on 
their single-cross inbred hybrid experiments, Wallace was debating the findings with 
Iowa State College agronomists in Ames.  In 1912 he conducted his own experiments to 
produce single-cross hybrids.  At the time, he concluded that the difficulty of hand 
pollination “was too laborious” [Wallace quoted by Culver and Hyde 2000: 67].  Over 
the next several years Wallace experimented with varietal hybrids without achieving 
consistent success.  But when Edward East visited Wallace in 1919 and introduced him to 
Donald Jones’ results with double-cross hybrids, Wallace immediately saw the 
commercial potential and began his own experiments with the new technique.  He also 
used the pages of Wallaces’ Farmer to proclaim the coming revolution [Culver and Hyde 
2000: 68].  In 1920 the circulation of Wallaces’ Farmer was 65,200 [Galambos 1968: 
344].  The journal was read by a high proportion of corn and hog farmers.  
In 1920 Wallace convinced the Iowa State Agronomist, H. D. Hughes, to establish 
the Iowa Corn Yield Tests.  The idea was to challenge the current practice of judging 
corn by the physical appearance of the ear and instead focus on yields per acre.  Wallace 
did not have enough seed to offer an entry of his own that first year, and his entry for 
1921 failed to outperform the best of the open-pollinated varieties.  He entered a new 
hybrid, named Copper Cross, in the 1922 tests and again in 1923, but it too failed to out-
yield the best open-pollinated entries.  However, Copper Cross was successful enough 
that Wallace was able to draw up a contract for its commercial release with the Iowa Seed 
Company.  When Copper Cross won the gold medal at the 1924 test, the 
commercialization of hybrid corn was launched.
19  Wallace himself wrote the first 
advertising copy.  “An Astonishing Product—Produces Astonishing Results … If you try 
it this year you will be among the first to experiment with this new departure, which will 
eventually increase corn production of the U.S. by millions of bushels” [quoted by Culver 
and Hyde 2000: 71].   
                                                 
19 The Funk Brothers Seed Company introduced its first double-cross hybrid in 1928 [Fitzgerald 1990: 
218].  
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In 1926 Wallace founded the Hi-Bred Seed Company [Culver and Hyde 2000: 82-
83].  He continued to use the pages of Wallaces’ Farmer to proclaim the virtues of hybrid 
corn and, of course, to advertise his company’s seed.  In that same year and the following 
year hybrid corns did reasonably well in the Iowa Corn Yield Tests recording about a 7 
percent greater yield than their open-pollinated rivals.  But that was an insufficient 
advantage to create much demand.   
There were several obstacles, not the least of which was the astonishing price that 
Wallace was asking for his “astonishing” seed – it was $52 bushel in 1924 [May 1949: 
514, Culver and Hyde 2000: 71].  Two founding principles of the Hi-Bred Seed Company 
were first, total honesty in advertising and, second, high prices.  “High prices, Wallace 
believed, were necessary to convince farmers they were buying something special” and, 
of course, high profits helped cover the cost of on-going research intended to improve the 
varieties [pp. 91 and 148].    
Another obstacle that had to be overcome was the reluctance of many farmers to 
abandon their reliance on their own home-grown seed and instead entertain a visit by, and 
the commercial pitch of, the traveling seed salesman.  The role of the salesman was not 
so much to educate the farmer – the genetics of inbred-hybrid crosses and the “magic” of 
heterosis exceeded the common-sense knowledge of most farmers and indeed of most 
seed salesman.  The claims of superiority had to be accepted, if they were, on faith. It was 
a particularly sore point with many farmers that seeds saved from a hybrid crop could not 
themselves be planted the next season with any hope of success.  So, old habits were 
challenged.  A commitment to hybrid seed was tantamount to an agreement to deal with 
the seed salesman every subsequent year as well as the current year.  And that 
commitment meant that the farmer’s skill in selecting seed corn from his own crop, a skill 
which many took great pride in, would be no longer needed or esteemed [Fitzgerald 
1993].  
Pioneer Hi-Bred designed a sophisticated marketing plan to address these 
problems.  Seed salesmen working for Wallace offered to provide the reluctant farmer  
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enough seed free of charge to plant half of his acreage.  The farmer would plant the 
remaining land with the open-pollinated seed he preferred.  In exchange the Hi-Bred 
company would reclaim one-half of the increased crop produced by its seed judged 
against the farmer’s regular crop [Culver and Hyde 2000: 91].  Typically, only one 
farmer on each lane was offered the deal with the hope that a demonstration effect would 
spread interest to the neighborhood.  Other farmers were given yield guarantees [May 
1949: 514].  According to Culver and Hyde, it often took several years to persuade a 
farmer that the higher yields achieved with the Hi-Bred seed were not a fluke [p. 91].   
With the advent of the Great Depression in the 1930s, marketing the new seed 
became even more difficult.  As I have noted, the Depression had sent the market price of 
corn tumbling from a high of 85 cents a bushel in the late 1920s to 32 cents in 1932 and 
Iowa farmers, many who faced ruin, were hardly in the mood for experimentation and 
risk taking.  Safety first was the general rule.  Moreover the average yield gains from 
switching to hybrids were, as I have already pointed out, generally insufficient to justify 
the cost of seed.   
Henry Agard Wallace became President Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture in 
1933.  The public position did not damp his enthusiasm for hybrid corn.  For many years 
the Agriculture Department had published an annual volume, The Yearbook of 
Agriculture, devoted to reporting on the activities of the Department, of advances in 
many fields, and offering both general and specific advice to farmers.  The Yearbooks 
had large press runs and were widely distributed by members of Congress to their 
farming constituency.  For the 1936 edition Wallace made an unusual decision.  As he 
explained: 
The 1936 Yearbook of Agriculture differs … from those published in 
recent years. … This year it is devoted to a single subject – the creative 
development of new forms of life through plant and animal breeding 
[Wallace 1936: foreword].     
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The article on “Corn Improvement” for this Yearbook was written by Merle T. Jenkins, 
the USDA’s Principal Agronomist.  A headline exaggeratedly claimed “Yield Advances 
up to 35 Percent over Open-Pollinated Varieties” [Jenkins 1936: 481].  The report was 
based on the Iowa Corn Yield Test despite the exaggeration of the headline. 
  In retrospect, and perhaps even at the time, the focus of the 1936 Yearbook was in 
jarring contrast to other efforts of the Roosevelt Administration to deal with the Great 
Depression.  For the first several years of his administration, Wallace presided over the 
acreage reduction and crop destruction policies of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration.  He was the one who ordered the plowing up of ten million acres of 
cotton in 1933 and the slaughter of six million baby pigs and sows in September [Culver 
and Hyde 2000: 123-125].  Yet Wallace looked into the future beyond the current crisis 
to foresee a time when the yield increases to be made possible by the spread of hybrid 
corn would be welcome.   
  By today’s standards, the glaring conflict of interest between Wallace’s financial 
interest in the Pioneer Hi-Bred Company and the use of the government agency he 
controlled to advertise and advocate his product would be outrageous.  But even this 
propaganda barrage combined with the innovative marketing strategy of his company 
might not have been successful in tipping the balance in favor of hybrid corn.  It took two 
other factors to put the company on the road to success.  
 Drought and Research 
The eventual success of hybrid corn was due, first, to a tipping event and then to the self-
reinforcing momentum of biotechnology.  The factor which acted to tip the balance in 
favor of hybrid adoption was paradoxically another disaster to bedevil corn farmers in the 
1930s.  As if the Depression, with its devastating impact on agricultural prices were not 
enough, there were catastrophic droughts in 1934 and 1936.  An index of the severity of 
these droughts is the fraction of the crop planted which was harvested.  In Iowa and in the 
country overall, thirty to forty percent of the acreage planted was so devastated by  
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drought that it was not worth harvesting.   In Nebraska and Kansas the losses were nearly 
total.  The data for Iowa are presented in Figure 7. 
What the droughts starkly demonstrated was that the relative yield of hybrid corn 
was greatest when the absolute yields were generally depressed.  Figure 8 reveals the 
relationship using, once again, the Iowa Corn Yield Test results to illustrate the 
correlation.  In the extreme drought conditions of the mid 1930s, the yield differences 
between the new and traditional varieties were stark.  Edward May, President of the May 
Seed Company, recalled: 
Yield differences became plainly evident in 1936, which was also a 
severe drouth year in Iowa.  At this time nearly all farmers who were 
testing hybrid seed corn planted only a limited acreage.  Yields of 
hybrids under these conditions in many areas of the state were 
approximately double the yields of other corn grown on the farm.  The 
results were so convincing that it marked the end of the vast efforts of 
initial adoption  [May 1949: 514]. 
“Almost overnight, demand for hybrid seed exploded” [Culver and Hyde 2000: 149].  
Big percentage point gains in adoption came in 1937: 22.3 percentage points accounted 
for by new adoptions in Illinois, 21.2 percentage points Iowa, 18.3 points in Ohio, 17.4 in 
Indiana, 12.9 in Wisconsin [see footnote 3 for sources].   
  Once the move to hybrid corn was launched -- and only because the switch was 
made – the technological diffusion process became self-sustaining and irreversible.   The 
steady improvement of the yield advantage of hybrid corn began in 1937.  See Figure 4, 
but also Figure 9 which illustrates the shift in the relative hybrid advantage after 1936. 
Farmers might have switched to hybrid corn out of fear of continued drought, but soon 
the genetic advance in hybrid corn made open-pollinated corn obsolete even though the 
price of hybrid seed was high and a farmer using it would need to purchase fresh seed 
each season.  This genetic improvement was achieved thanks to continuing research 
funded by the seed companies using retained earnings generated by soaring sales and 
high prices.    
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Wallace believed that his hybrid revolution would have collapsed without a 
continuing, well-financed, research effort [Culver and Hyde 2000: 148].  Research by the 
federal government also played a supporting role.
20  The research in both sectors was 
closely co-coordinated.  According to Sprague [1945: 101] there was unrestricted 
interchange of ideas and seed stock between government researchers and the private 
companies.  Most observers agree that the for-profit research was the driving partner of 
the private-federal joint effort after 1937 [Griliches 1958: 420-421 and Table 1, p. 424; 
Duvick 2001: 71;  Fuglie, Ballenger, et al 1996: 45, Fernandez-Cornejo 2004: 41-50].  
Wallace claimed that his company spent more money on corn research than the USDA 
and the state experiment stations combined [Culver and Hyde 2000: 148].   
Ironically, the drought of 1934 was, in part, responsible for the remarkable 
improvement in hybrid development seen thereafter.  One of the farmers that Hi-Bred 
recruited as part of its experimental research on new hybrid strains suffered greatly in the 
drought of 1934.  Most of his experimental plants were lost.  But he continued to work 
with the few plants that had managed to survive.  The result was the unexpected 
discovery of a hardy new hybrid, number 307, with a remarkable ability to withstand 
drought.  Consult Figure 4 again, where number 307 is labeled for easy identification. 
The experimenter remarked that this plant “proved very valuable when we found 
ourselves in another serious drought condition in the summer of 1936” [Culver and Hyde 
2000: 149].   
What we have, then, is a story of the diffusion of hybrid corn that is more 
complex and more interesting than the one usually told by Griliches-inspired plant 
scientists [Griliches, Science, 1960].  Rather than disequilibrium transition slowed by 
information imperfections that were gradually overcome by commercial advertising and 
                                                 
20 In 1922 when Henry Agard Wallace’s father, Henry C. Wallace, was Secretary of Agriculture a well-
funded hybrid corn research program was established by the Department in cooperation with the 
Experiment Stations in several corn-belt states.  This federal program was vital during the 1920s.  Donald 
Duvick suggests that “the commercial maize breeders probably could not have succeeded in the early years 
[without the contributions from the public sector], for individually they simply did not have enough inbred 
lines …” [Duvick 2001: 71].   
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agricultural extension education, the history reveals that neither the innovation of 1918, 
nor the commercial product of 1924, nor the highly-touted seeds of 1934 were 
economically and culturally attractive.  The advertising and marketing campaigns of the 
seed companies were effective in the late 1920s or early 1930s not because they educated 
farmers, but because they offered inducements designed to lower the costs and risks of 
adoption, shifting those costs and risks to the seed companies.  The tipping point came in 
1936.  How much credit should be given to the Yearbook of Agriculture that year and 
how much to the drought would be difficult to say given their simultaneity.  But what is 
clear is that the genetic advance in hybrid corn varieties beginning with hybrid 307 
introduced commercially in 1936 is what locked in the transitional adopters and made the 
hybrid revolution seem inevitable in retrospect.  Had Wallace not used the bully pulpit of 
the USDA to promote his own commercial and financial interests, had the USDA not 
supported the research effort in the late 1920s and early 1930s, had the droughts of 1934 
and 1936 not occurred, had Hi-Bred not continued a major research effort following 
1936, the Wallace crusade might have succumbed as just another fatality of the Great 
Depression.   
Ammonia and Tractors 
I might close on this note, but there is one point worth adding.  This takes us back 
to Figure 2 and the idea that the yield advances after 1935 can be attributed exclusively to 
the adoption of hybrid corn and its continuing improvement.  Certainly the “hockey-stick 
graph” displayed in Figure 2 is an almost irresistible piece of evidence.  Yet an important 
curiosity, not reported in the academic literature on corn yields, is that the same hockey-
stick profile with the same transition date is seen in most other crops.  Wheat, cotton, 
potatoes, barley, tobacco, oats; they all display the same time-series profile.  See Figure 
10.   
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Hybridization cannot explain similar spurts in yield per acre in these other crops.  
Plant breeders have yet to successfully develop commercial hybrids for any of them.
21    
Indeed, very different stories have been told about each crop.  For example, the advances 
in cotton yields between 1935 and 1965 have been attributed to increasing participation 
in the Smith-Doxey Cotton Grading Program [Olmstead and Rhode 2003].  The advances 
in tobacco yields are attributed to the acreage reductions under the AAA and “better 
cultural practices” [USDA, “Tobaccos of the United States,” 1948: 30].  The story 
usually told for wheat involves the cross-breeding of short and semi-dwarf varieties from 
Asia [Dalrymple 1986 and 1988: Figure 2, p. 81].  The only common element that 
explains productivity advances in all of these crops, including corn, is the introduction of 
synthetic fertilizer.   
Vaclav Smil makes the case that “the single most important change affecting the 
world’s population – its expansion from 1.6 billion people in 1900 to today’s 6 billion – 
would not have been possible without the synthesis of ammonia” [Smil 2001: xiii].  The 
nitrogen in ammonia (NH3) is the key.  Plants need nitrogen but they cannot absorb it 
from the air.  The nitrogen must be “fixed” as in ammonia or ammonium nitrate 
(NH4NO3).  Decomposing plant material can return fixed nitrogen to the soil, nitrogen-
fixing bacteria can manufacture ammonia, and lightening can oxidize nitrogen.  
Nonetheless, on heavily-cropped land, a shortage of fixed nitrogen can become the 
bottleneck that prevents crop yields from being sustained year after year.  Thus the 
invention of a process to synthesize ammonia by Fritz Haber and the development of a 
commercially-viable ammonia manufacturing process by Carl Bosch shortly before 
World War I deserve much of the credit for the explosion of crop yields across so many 
                                                 
21 Hybridization is technically feasible for many field crops other than corn but is generally-speaking not 
economical [Fuglie, Ballenger, et al 1996: 34].  Sorghum and sugar beets are two exceptions.  However, 
many of the flower and vegetable seeds sold to individual consumers are hybrids.  For an account of the 
unsuccessful effort to develop hybrid wheat see Knudson and Ruttan [1988].  
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crops after the mid-1930s.
22  For their work, Haber was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1918; 
Bosch received his in 1931.   
As a consequence of these discoveries, commercial fertilizers became 
considerably cheaper and their use exploded at precisely the time when the yield per acre 
in crop after crop began to rise.  Indeed, the graph of commercial fertilizer use displayed 
as Figure 11 displays its own hockey-stick profile.  
There is widespread agreement that the adoption and increasing improvement of 
hybrid corn was accompanied by increasing application of nitrogen fertilizers [Shaw and 
Durost 1965: Table 21, p. 39; Johnson 1960].  It was also accompanied by the 
introduction of the tractor and increased planting densities.
23  But these were not 
independent influences.  Hybrid corn varieties were developed to take maximum 
advantage of fertilizer and the increased planting densities would not have been possible 
unless the hybrid varieties could thrive when planted so close together.  Increased 
planting densities required the gasoline-powered tractor as well as the heavy application 
of fertilizer.  Where horse-drawn equipment was employed, reducing the space between 
corn rows was limited by the physical space required for the horse.   
The appealing search for a mono-causal story for the yield advance in corn, I 
argue, is wrong headed.  The corn yield advance is certainly due to unique circumstances 
in the industry, but the introduction of hybrid corn is only one of them. Moreover, the 
story we would tell for corn cannot be generalized to other crops.  Each crop requires its 
own detailed study.  Commercial fertilizer is, perhaps, the only common element.   
                                                 
22 The timing of these discoveries was important since synthetic ammonia was used by the Germans in the 
production of explosives and thus probably prolonged the war.  Haber also played a major role in the 
development and deployment of poison gas for the Germans during the war.  There are two excellent 
biographies of Haber [Stoltzenberg 2004 and Charles 2005].  
23 In 1939 only 9 percent of the corn was planted using tractor planters in the Corn Belt states.  In 1946 the 
percentage had jumped to 44 percent and 82 percent of the acreage was cultivated with tractors and 64 
percent of the acreage was harvested with mechanical corn pickers [USDA, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, 1949: Tables 19-20, pp. 58-59].  See Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode [2001] for a general 
discussion of the diffusion and impact of the tractor.  
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β = 1.16 bushels/year
RYD = Reid’s Yellow Dent (open pollinated)
Average over three planting densities 
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District 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
1 117 109 110 109 114 116 115 114 112 111 107 107 115 110 108
2 105 117 120 124 113 * 102 110 101 109 118 109 109 115 122
3 97 103 109 114 111 106 102 107 119 106 126 112 118 114 +
4 116 105 110 110 116 112 107 129 111 121 * 108 114 113 121
5 107 111 108 108 114 113 108 128 108 107 129 114 112 107 127
6 105 110 103 103 105 109 106 116 106 103 117 108 117 116 115
7 105 103 114 109 113 107 112 * 150 131 120 121
10 111 102 111 108 102 105 102 140 133 120 141 132
8 104 98 115 109 124 108 110 127 109 112 112 116
11 103 114 108 112 111 106 111 154 114 134 115 #
9 105 102 114 114 106 107 106 149 114 106 110 122
12 110 107 104 106 103 102 100 141 118 115 108 118
* Crop lost -- drought
+ Poor crop -- "not calculated"




Iowa Corn Yield Tests, 1926-1940
Relative Average Yield for all Hybrid Varieties
All Open-Pollinated Varieties = 100
Note: For 1933-1935 districts 10, 11, and 12 
were combined with districts 7, 8, and 9 
respectively.
Source: Marcus S. Zuber and Joe L. Robinson, “The 1940 Iowa Corn Yield 
Test,” [Iowa] Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin P19 NS, February 
1941:589.
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Percent of Planted Corn Acreage Harvested
1934
1936 Iowa
 Richard Sutch, Adoption of Hybrid Corn 
FIGURE 8 
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std dev = 9.9
Density Estimate of Relative Hybrid Yield
1926-1933 and 1937-1939 Iowa Corn Yield Tests 
Relative Yield
[open-pollinated varieties = 100]
 Richard Sutch, Adoption of Hybrid Corn 
FIGURE 10 
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FIGURE 11 











Source: Susan Carter et al, Editors, Historical Statistics of the United States, Cambridge University Press, 2006, Series Da20 and Da644
 